<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482</id><updated>2011-12-01T17:27:55.868-05:00</updated><title type='text'>Law and Economics</title><subtitle type='html'>law and economics, rational choice theory, behavioral economics, etc. </subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><link rel='next' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default?start-index=101&amp;max-results=100'/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>107</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108961049317487124</id><published>2004-07-12T01:34:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2004-07-12T01:34:53.173-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>...</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108961049317487124'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108961049317487124'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_07_01_archive.html#108961049317487124' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108673168300170141</id><published>2004-06-08T17:48:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2004-06-08T17:55:53.250-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Assorted MattersVisit my eponymous blog. I managed to rid the posts from this site for a while after messing with the settings. Everything should be back to normal. Again. Also, I received a few messages about possibly jumping on board to help out with the blog. Unfortunately, the email account I posted put everything into the spam section and I only just recently was able to read the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108673168300170141'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108673168300170141'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_06_01_archive.html#108673168300170141' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108448175880919831</id><published>2004-05-13T16:55:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2004-05-13T17:33:09.046-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Law and Economics BlogThe posts should be back on the main page now. In other news, if anyone is interested in contributing to this site please contact me [ggoelzhauser@crescatsententia.org]. I'm looking to focus on some other areas before heading off to graduate school in political science, but I don't want to kill this blog. The alternatives are (1) to drastically slow the pace of posting, or</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108448175880919831'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108448175880919831'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_05_01_archive.html#108448175880919831' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108145146109343622</id><published>2004-04-08T15:11:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2004-04-22T13:35:23.513-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New ScholarshipJonathan Baron and Edward McCaffery have posted Masking Redistribution (or its Absence). Here is the abstract: Research has shown that people vary widely in their support or opposition to progressive taxation. We argue here that the perception of progressiveness itself is affected by the nature of the tax system and by the way it is framed, or presented. Experiments conducted </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108145146109343622'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108145146109343622'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_04_01_archive.html#108145146109343622' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108067078189422473</id><published>2004-03-30T13:19:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-30T13:25:13.546-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Becker on How He Came to Develop an Economic Theory of CrimeI was coming down for an oral exam at Columbia University when I was teaching there. In those days instead of written exams for Ph.D. students, we gave them orals. And my task was to ask a half-hour of questions on price theory. I was living in the suburbs, I drove down to Columbia and I was a little late. And it's New York City, so </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108067078189422473'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108067078189422473'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#108067078189422473' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108042814366816621</id><published>2004-03-27T17:55:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-27T18:05:15.733-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New ScholarshipLynn Stout has posted On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board). Here's the abstract: One of the most important questions in corporate governance is how directors of public corporations can be motivated to serve the interests of the firm. Directors frequently hold only small stakes in the companies they </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108042814366816621'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108042814366816621'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#108042814366816621' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108024020532103671</id><published>2004-03-25T13:43:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-25T13:46:54.123-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Behvaioral Analysis of Legal InstitutionsFlorida State is hosting its Spring 2004 Symposium titled The Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions: Possibilities, Limitations, and New Directions on Friday and Saturday. Here's the Program Overview:Legal scholars increasingly analyze legal phenomena from a behavioral perspective, relying on findings from psychology, behavioral economics, and </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108024020532103671'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108024020532103671'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#108024020532103671' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-108008938768805198</id><published>2004-03-23T19:49:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-23T19:58:09.030-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship and Problems With SSRNI have not been able to access SSRN lately. The links I have (for the law portal and economics portal) now display a "request timed out" message after a few moments of attempting to access the page. If anyone knows a way around this (the page suggests a fix, but I haven't been able to get it to work), please let me know. I'll be most grateful. Until I'm able</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108008938768805198'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/108008938768805198'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#108008938768805198' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107996163639890841</id><published>2004-03-22T08:20:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-22T08:26:33.530-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Professor Bainbridge on Agency CostsProfessor Solum's Legal Theory Blog inspired the creation of this blog. His Legal Theory Bookworm has inspired the creation of at least one similar series--Tim Sandefur's Libertarian Bookworm. Now another of his fabulous creations--the Legal Theory Lexicon--has inspired a similar series from corporate law superstar Stephen Bainbridge: the Corporation Law </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107996163639890841'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107996163639890841'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107996163639890841' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107983896907985248</id><published>2004-03-20T22:16:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-22T13:54:08.763-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Constitutional Law and the Economics of EcstasyI've blogged before about Hugo Mialon's graduate work on the economics of ecstasy. When strolling through his home page at the time, I also read his pieces on the fourth and fifth amendments and barriers to entry. Mialon is back in the news via Steven Landsburg's Slate article titled The Economics of Faking Orgasm: No, Really. Landsburg spends </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107983896907985248'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107983896907985248'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107983896907985248' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107983268439625714</id><published>2004-03-20T20:31:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-20T22:23:21.450-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Site DesignI've changed the site design in an effort to reduce the clutter and brighten things up a bit. All of the links that were on the old site can be found by clicking through the categories on the left; you will be taken to a new "blog," which you can return from by clicking on "Home." You can also navigate the categories from inside each section. Of course, nothing is permanent. If </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107983268439625714'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107983268439625714'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107983268439625714' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107972481889938096</id><published>2004-03-19T14:33:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-20T22:26:06.936-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Dual JuriesFindLaw delivered a most interesting case to my inbox yesterday. In Re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation is a petition of appeal from a District Court in Illinois to the Seventh Circuit. The question presented was whether a judge might impanel two juries in a civil case given appropriate circumstances. The factual situation in the present case is as follows. Four firms </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107972481889938096'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107972481889938096'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107972481889938096' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107962253199852716</id><published>2004-03-18T10:08:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-20T20:03:35.216-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>The Economic Way of Thinking Clearly?The blogosphere has not been short on comments relating to this story (See, e.g., Professor Volokh and Julian Sanchez), which tells of the plight of wrongly convicted persons being billed for room and board by British officials for the time they spent in prison. Most have been outraged by the decision, but Micha Ghertner, in an interesting post at Catallarchy</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107962253199852716'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107962253199852716'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107962253199852716' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107954859349907712</id><published>2004-03-17T13:36:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-17T13:56:07.076-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Recommended Reading: Check out Nate Oman's post in reaction to Louis Kaplow &amp; Steven Shavell's Fairness Versus Welfare. Also take a look at Andrew Chamberlain--host of The Idea Shop--on honey bees and Giffen goods.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107954859349907712'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107954859349907712'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107954859349907712' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107953947074241899</id><published>2004-03-17T11:04:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-17T11:16:45.450-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Conflating the Status Quo Bias and Endowment Effect: Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie have just posted Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table. In it, the authors offer the following as a partial explanation of the status quo bias as it relates to negotiation: "The status quo bias suggests that, all other things being equal, negotiators will prefer their initial endowments over endowments</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107953947074241899'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107953947074241899'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107953947074241899' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107946685753429657</id><published>2004-03-16T14:54:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-16T19:16:01.653-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Sunk Costs and the Omission Bias: Tyler Cowen has an interesting post (with links) asking, "When is it rational to honor sunk costs?". Toward the end Professor Cowan says, "Let's not forget the game-theoretic rationale for honoring sunk costs: You might honor sunk costs so that others do not perceive you as wasteful, or so that others perceive you as constant and reliable." He also suggests a </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107946685753429657'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107946685753429657'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107946685753429657' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107940673767337666</id><published>2004-03-15T22:12:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-15T22:15:33.716-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Blogroll Addition: The Idea Shop has moved here. According to the old site, the new will focus more on economics. Andrew David Chamberlain--the host of The Idea Shop--is always sharp and interesting, and I much enjoyed the old site. With the additional focus on economics, I expect the new to be even more entertaining. The first post up on the new site is titled trickle-down economics. Check it </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107940673767337666'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107940673767337666'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107940673767337666' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107935622814417514</id><published>2004-03-15T08:10:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-15T08:13:43.373-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Blog: I'm pleased to announce that my former En Banc co-bloggers--Chris Geidner, Jeremy Blachman, Nick Morgan, and PG--have unveiled a new group blog project: De Novo. The first post introduces a new concept developed by the group: the blog symposium. In the first installment of this month's symposium--titled "Perspectives on Legal Education"--the group has posted invited essays from </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107935622814417514'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107935622814417514'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107935622814417514' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107935565400141139</id><published>2004-03-15T08:00:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-15T08:04:09.356-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Jonathan Klick, who, as I've mentioned here, will be coming to FSU in the fall, has posted two new papers. Econometric Analyses of U.S. Abortion Policy: A Critical Review. Here's the abstract: Although most of the debates on abortion policy hinge on normative beliefs about the relative rights of women and their unborn children, the regulation of abortion access has large </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107935565400141139'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107935565400141139'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107935565400141139' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107935513531829991</id><published>2004-03-15T07:52:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-15T07:55:29.966-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz have posted Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions. Here's the abstract: The standard contract that governs friendly mergers contains a material adverse change clause (a MAC) and a material adverse effect clause (a MAE); these clauses permit a buyer costlessly to cancel the deal if such a change or effect occurs. In recent years, the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107935513531829991'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107935513531829991'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107935513531829991' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107871909384508185</id><published>2004-03-07T23:11:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-07T23:16:14.856-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Elhauge on Predatory Pricing: Einer Elhauge (Harvard) has (relatively) recently published a fabulous article on predatory pricing that I'm just getting around to: Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Do Not Signal Predation or Even Market Power - And the Implications for Defining Costs, 112 Yale L.J. 681 (2003). In the article, Elhauge responds to a recent influx in scholarship and </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107871909384508185'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107871909384508185'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107871909384508185' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107854253398833931</id><published>2004-03-05T22:08:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-06T00:46:32.420-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: I have been working on some projects that don't leave much time for blogging, but breaks have been fun, reading some recently posted papers. I recommend Irit Haviv Segal's recently posted article titled A Cost-benefit Theory of Social Institutions. Here's the abstract: This article presents a new theory of institutions. It develops a novel answer to the theoretical question, </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107854253398833931'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107854253398833931'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107854253398833931' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107844593624338679</id><published>2004-03-04T19:18:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-04T19:21:57.000-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Blog: Nate Oman--whose A Good Oman I much enjoyed--has moved to Tutissima Cassis, where he is discussing "law, politics, and philosophy." Readers of this blog will want to take a look at one of his early posts titled My Problem With Expressed Preferences. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107844593624338679'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107844593624338679'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107844593624338679' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107815327324035775</id><published>2004-03-01T10:01:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-03-01T10:04:47.856-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Social Welfare Functions: Check out Professor's Solum's Legal Theory Lexicon--a weekly series of introductory posts on important concepts to legal theory--entry on social welfare functions. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107815327324035775'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107815327324035775'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_archive.html#107815327324035775' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107800268912841246</id><published>2004-02-28T16:11:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-28T16:14:22.890-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Severin Borenstein has posted Understanding Competitive Pricing and Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets. Here's the abstract: Discussions of competition in restructured electricity markets have revealed many misunderstandings about the definition, diagnosis, and implications of market power. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the meaning of market power and show how </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107800268912841246'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107800268912841246'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107800268912841246' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107780722135556675</id><published>2004-02-26T09:53:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-26T09:56:31.390-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: William Kovacic and Carl Shapiro have posted Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking. Here's the abstract: Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107780722135556675'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107780722135556675'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107780722135556675' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107773200049901124</id><published>2004-02-25T13:00:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-25T13:03:36.733-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Workshop: Legal Theory Blog points to Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral Law and Economics, by Claire Hill, being presented today at George Mason. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107773200049901124'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107773200049901124'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107773200049901124' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107768227072686561</id><published>2004-02-24T23:11:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-24T23:13:59.356-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Antitrust: Here is a nice, short piece from Tim Brennan--The Legacy of U.S. v. Microsoft.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107768227072686561'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107768227072686561'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107768227072686561' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107759729636103190</id><published>2004-02-23T23:34:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-24T07:32:25.233-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Some time back I mentioned Scott Baker and Kimberly Krawiec's The Penalty Default Canon. Baker and Krawiec's paper is interesting and thought provoking. If you haven't yet, check it out. Mark Seidenfeld (Florida State) has posted a response--Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the Public Would Lose Under the "Penalty Default Canon. Here's the abstract: In their forthcoming article</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107759729636103190'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107759729636103190'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107759729636103190' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107739653987774968</id><published>2004-02-21T15:48:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-21T15:51:43.436-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Cass Susntein has posted Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of Statistical Lives. Here's the abstract: Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a statistical life. This is a serious mistake. The very theory that underlies current practice calls for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107739653987774968'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107739653987774968'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107739653987774968' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107730042369234885</id><published>2004-02-20T13:07:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-20T13:09:46.326-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Steven Shavell has posted On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts . Abstract: The major theme of this article is that the interpretation of contracts - their possible amplification, correction, and modification by adjudicators - is in the interests of contracting parties. The general reasons are (a) that interpretation may improve on otherwise imperfect contracts; </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107730042369234885'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107730042369234885'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107730042369234885' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107729582299135556</id><published>2004-02-20T11:50:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-20T12:03:31.216-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Group Home: Since the demise of En Banc, I've been out of work on the group blog front. No more. I've happily accepted an invitation to join Crescat Sententia. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107729582299135556'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107729582299135556'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107729582299135556' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107707366690086621</id><published>2004-02-17T22:07:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-17T22:10:25.920-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Cass Sunstein has posted Black on Brown. (This is not a law and economics paper, but I'm currently out of work on the non law and econ blog front, and in any event I think anything by Sunstein deserves a pass.) Here's the abstract:The most important and illuminating early writing on Brown v. Bd. of Education is a nine-page essay by Charles Black. Black memorably shows that </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107707366690086621'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107707366690086621'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107707366690086621' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107704734701584102</id><published>2004-02-17T14:49:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-17T14:51:45.043-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Specialty Blogs: After a period of being highly skeptical of blogs focused on a particular area of the law, I (obviously) became a convert. For me, having a general focus helps with learning and is generally quite fun. I decided that I preffered focusing on a particular area without defining the blog by the area with a particular title (e.g. Law and Economics Blog), but after moving away from my </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107704734701584102'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107704734701584102'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107704734701584102' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107702046089868473</id><published>2004-02-17T07:21:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-17T07:23:38.983-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Daniel Klein (Santa Clara, economics) has posted The People's Romance: Why People Love Government (As Much as They Do). Here's the abstract: Using Schelling's analysis of mutual coordination and focal points, I interpret Smithian sympathy as sentiment coordination. When the yearning for sentiment coordination seeks, further, for it to encompass the whole social group and looks </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107702046089868473'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107702046089868473'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107702046089868473' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107689657708546807</id><published>2004-02-15T20:56:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-16T00:33:13.373-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>En Banc: As some of you may have seen, En Banc is no more. This came as quite a surprise to me; I actually found out from a posting by Will Baude at Crescat Sententia. This was Unlearned Hand's decision alone, and I'm sorry to see the site go. I have virtually no idea why he decided to end the "experiment." He says the "site may resurface in another form at some point in the future," but I can </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107689657708546807'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107689657708546807'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107689657708546807' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107679705367090381</id><published>2004-02-14T17:17:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-14T17:20:08.153-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>More for Valentine's Day: Jeremy Blachman--En Banc co-blogger, Harvard law student, and comedy genius--has posted A Valentine's Day Civil Procedure Love Song.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107679705367090381'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107679705367090381'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107679705367090381' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107677663040749211</id><published>2004-02-14T11:37:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-14T17:17:35.576-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Valentine's Day--Relationship Special: Read here about a mathematical model designed to predict marriage success. The first step in the process is analysing a conversation between the couple concerning a matter of contention or disagreement, such as sex or money. Observers score each partner during the conversation using a strict set of criteria. Important factors include the extent to which </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107677663040749211'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107677663040749211'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107677663040749211' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107664007555974045</id><published>2004-02-12T21:41:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-12T21:43:47.356-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Link Addition: I've added a link under the "Programs and Centers" heading to Loyola University Chicago's Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107664007555974045'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107664007555974045'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107664007555974045' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107659736241580447</id><published>2004-02-12T09:49:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-12T10:13:15.996-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Terrence Chorvat, Vernon Smith, and Kevin McCabe have posted Law and Neuroeconomics. Here's the abstract: As legal scholarship has come to rely more on economic analysis, the foundational questions of economics have become important questions for legal analysis as well. One of the key foundational elements of modern economics is the assumption of the rational utility maximizing</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107659736241580447'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107659736241580447'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107659736241580447' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107659681705174976</id><published>2004-02-12T09:40:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-12T09:42:48.013-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Luca Andelini et al. have posted Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? Here's the abstract: We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107659681705174976'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107659681705174976'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107659681705174976' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107651476072320364</id><published>2004-02-11T10:52:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-11T10:58:06.060-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Posner Opinions and Reading for Pleasure: I know people who get great joy out of reading the many great works of fiction available for consumption. Others, like Unlearned Hand--my co-blogger at En Banc--simply love literature, and will read virtually any (and perhaps all in Unlearned Hand's case) book(s) they can get their hands on for enjoyment. I enjoy reading as much as anyone else, but I get </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107651476072320364'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107651476072320364'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107651476072320364' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107643674352634392</id><published>2004-02-10T13:12:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-10T13:20:05.966-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Here are the highlights from yesterday and today. Louis kaplow &amp; Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply.Omri Ben-Shahar, 'Agreeing to Disagree': Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts .Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law .Paul Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient? .Paul Rubin, </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107643674352634392'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107643674352634392'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107643674352634392' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107622286997384512</id><published>2004-02-08T01:47:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-08T01:50:14.810-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Sunday Reading in Law and Economics: If you're looking for a short piece to enjoy while lying about enjoying your Sunday, try A. Mitchell Polinsky &amp; Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts. Here's the abstract: This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107622286997384512'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107622286997384512'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107622286997384512' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107609733222226299</id><published>2004-02-06T14:55:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-06T15:00:14.153-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Jason Dana, Daylian Cain, and Robyn Dawes (all at Carnegie Mellon) have posted Taking Pains to Avoid Giving. Here's the abstract: We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take in order to avoid engaging in it. We found that 30% of experimental senders were willing to "exit" a $10 Dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107609733222226299'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107609733222226299'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107609733222226299' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107600867159349292</id><published>2004-02-05T14:17:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-05T14:27:18.000-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Chris William Sanchirico (Penn) has posted Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error. Here's the abstract: Humans are imperfect information processors, a fact almost universally bemoaned in legal scholarship. But when it comes to how the legal system itself processes information, cognitive limitations are largely good news. Evidentiary procedure - inclusive of </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107600867159349292'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107600867159349292'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107600867159349292' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107600721218960136</id><published>2004-02-05T13:53:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-05T13:55:54.310-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Two by Friedman: I've recently added links to the online texts of David Friedman's Law's Order and Price Theory: An Introductory Text. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107600721218960136'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107600721218960136'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107600721218960136' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107592072078612236</id><published>2004-02-04T13:52:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-04T13:57:02.543-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Vermeule on Submajority Rules: The post directly below this one points to Adrian Vermeule's recently uploaded piece on Submajority Rules. I write now to give it my highest recommendation. Here's a taste: In essence, submajority rules are countermajoritarian because they violate the neutrality feature of majority rule, which requires that no choice be preferred over another by the voting rule </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107592072078612236'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107592072078612236'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107592072078612236' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107591949299837231</id><published>2004-02-04T12:03:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-04T13:42:39.983-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Adrian Vermeule (Chicago) has uploaded Submajority Rules (in Legislatures and Elsewhere). From the abstract: Legal and political theory have paid a great deal of attention to supermajority rules, which require a fraction of votes greater than 1/2+1 to reach a decision, and thus empower a minority to block change. In this paper I consider the opposite deviation from simple </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107591949299837231'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107591949299837231'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107591949299837231' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107591925915224095</id><published>2004-02-04T12:01:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-04T13:42:12.983-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: John K. Setear (Virgina) has uploaded Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice. Here's the abstract: Assume that, in attempting to effect international legal cooperation, national leaders can choose between using treaties and customary law as the form in which to embody their cooperative efforts. Which form of international law would we expect them to choose? I analyze </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107591925915224095'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107591925915224095'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107591925915224095' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107585092058080176</id><published>2004-02-03T18:28:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-04T13:24:38.280-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>From the Vault: Not Playing a Unique Nash Equilibrium: [The phrase "From the Vault" is meant to denote an interesting passage or something otherwise of interest from a work related to the study of law and economics.] As Doug Baird et al. note in Game Theory and the Law, there exists "games in which the unique Nash equilibrium may not be the combination of strategies that players would in fact </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107585092058080176'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107585092058080176'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107585092058080176' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107584775356815271</id><published>2004-02-03T17:35:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-03T17:38:12.590-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Information: If anyone knows of any good online resources related to the study of law and economics, please pass them along. In addition, if anyone has an idea for improving this site's content in any way, I'm open to suggestions. Feedback is always welcome. You can contact me by following the link on the sidebar. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107584775356815271'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107584775356815271'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107584775356815271' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107584647747703512</id><published>2004-02-03T17:14:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-03T17:30:19.106-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>About This Blog: [I just put a link on the sidebar to this message, but thought I would post it on the main page as well. If you read nothing else, check out the last paragraph. One of the reasons I abandoned this concept the first time around was that I did not want to give the impression that I knew much of anything. Two factors led me to try again: (1) I learned a lot the first time around and</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107584647747703512'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107584647747703512'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107584647747703512' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566655880811549</id><published>2004-02-01T15:15:00.003-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-03T16:53:37.310-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Steven Wu talks a little about the final exam taken in his administrative law course taught by Jerry Mashaw here. Steven's prompt leads me to mention the fabulous experience I've been having over the last couple of days with Professor Mashaw. In what is no doubt more enjoyable than taking his four hour essay exam, I've recently been re-reading his fabulous book Greed</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566655880811549'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566655880811549'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566655880811549' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566654396099375</id><published>2004-02-01T15:15:00.002-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:18:00.466-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Voter Ignorance: David Bernstein referenced the work of Ilya Somin on voter ignorance today, but didn't provide any citations or links. I've found Somin's work in this mode very interesting and thought I'd pass along two recent pieces of his that I am aware of: Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience (recently published at 45 Wm. &amp; Mary L. Rev. 595) and </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566654396099375'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566654396099375'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566654396099375' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566652291576603</id><published>2004-02-01T15:15:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:17:39.420-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>In Coase's Footsteps: On the tail of my earlier post pointing to Baird and Rasmussen's description of how Coase came to write The Nature of the Firm, I thought I'd pass along another interesting piece: Douglas Baird, In Coase's Footsteps, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (2003). In it, Baird revisits Coase's conversations with GM executives in order to "discover why they answered Coase's question the way </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566652291576603'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566652291576603'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566652291576603' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566650999893453</id><published>2004-02-01T15:15:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:17:26.500-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Amitai Aviram has just uploaded Accommodating a New Tenant in the House of Cards: Introducing Competition Into a Network Industry. Here's the abstract: The network facilities of many network industries are natural monopolies. It is well accepted, however, that certain network industries may efficiently accommodate competition between several firms over the utilization of the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566650999893453'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566650999893453'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566650999893453' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566649478490745</id><published>2004-02-01T15:14:00.002-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:17:11.280-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>The Nature of the Firm: Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen retell the story of how Nobel laureate economist  Ronald Coase came to write The Nature of the Firm.In the fall of 1931, a twenty-year-old undergraduate left England to spend the year in the United States on a traveling fellowship. The trip was in lieu of a final year at the London School of Economics. His research project was both </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566649478490745'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566649478490745'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566649478490745' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566646191798563</id><published>2004-02-01T15:14:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:16:38.420-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Eric Posner on Flowers, Candy, and Valentine's Day: As Valentine's Day fast approaches, I know a lot of men (and women, but this post isn't for you--at least the first part of it) are in desperate search for great gifts to give their significant other. If you fit this description, here's some advice from Eric Posner on the purchase of some of Valentine's Day's most traditional gifts: Gifts of </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566646191798563'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566646191798563'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566646191798563' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566644874684163</id><published>2004-02-01T15:14:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:16:25.263-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Although posted over a month ago, I just got around to reading Scott Baker (UNC) and Kimberly Krawiec's (UNC) highly interesting piece The Penalty Default Canon (forthcoming in the George Washington Law Review). Here's the abstract: Lawmakers often have an incentive to avoid making important policy choices, shifting responsibility for the outcomes of those choices onto other </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566644874684163'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566644874684163'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566644874684163' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566643576842466</id><published>2004-02-01T15:13:00.003-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:16:12.280-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Cass Sunstein: From That's News to Me, a new blog by students at Chicago:So anyway, I'm sure all of you are wondering, how does Cass Sunstein do it? He's the most cited legal scholar in the nation, he writes a book a week, he runs this project, and he's a nice, funny guy. Well, everyone has a theory on how he pulls it off (yes, even you, even if you've never heard of him). Here's mine:Elves. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566643576842466'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566643576842466'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566643576842466' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566642000193533</id><published>2004-02-01T15:13:00.002-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:15:56.530-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Social Networks: Andrei Shleifer (Harvard economics) and Kevin Murphy (Chicago economics) just posted Persuasion in Politics. As the abstract suggests, the article sets forth "a model of the creation of social networks". The authors begin by summarizing three well developed findings in the literature: (1) "beliefs are flexible and can be relatively easily influenced, particularly in areas where </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566642000193533'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566642000193533'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566642000193533' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566640374778168</id><published>2004-02-01T15:13:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:15:40.263-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Coase on Antitrust: Via Antitrust.org:Ronald [Coase] said he had gotten tired of antitrust because when the prices went up the judges said it was monopoly, when the prices went down they said it was predatory pricing, and when they stayed the same they said it was tacit collusion. --William Landes, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Econ at Chicago, JLE (1981) p. 193.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566640374778168'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566640374778168'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566640374778168' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566639012461618</id><published>2004-02-01T15:13:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:15:26.653-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Analytical Methods for Lawyers: I had the pleasure of recently picking up a free copy of a new textbook titled Analytical Methods for Lawyers. The authors all call Harvard home, and the list could hardly be more impressive: Howell Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, W. Kip Viscusi, and David Cope.Here is a layout of the chapters: 1. Decision Analysis (including introductions to, e.g., </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566639012461618'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566639012461618'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566639012461618' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566637515735913</id><published>2004-02-01T15:12:00.002-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:15:11.686-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Faculty at FSU: I know this is Professor Leiter's area, but I can't resist mentioning the exciting group of incoming faculty recently added to our faculty list. Amitai Aviram is currently a visiting assistant professor at George Mason. Professor Aviram has served as a staff attorney and consultant for the Israel Antitrust Authority, among other positions, and holds both an L.L.M. and J.S.D.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566637515735913'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566637515735913'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566637515735913' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566635362067400</id><published>2004-02-01T15:12:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:14:50.153-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Epstein Reviews Sowell: Richard Epstein has posted a review of Thomas Sowell's recently released Applied Economics: Thinking Beyond Page One. The opening paragraph is quite amusing: One time-tested principle of economic theory is diminishing marginal utility, and economics itself is no exception to this general rule. The initial returns to economic study are massive: Mastering a few key </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566635362067400'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566635362067400'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566635362067400' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566633825854549</id><published>2004-02-01T15:12:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:14:34.793-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Solum on the Economics of Bribery: Professor Solum relaying and commenting on a post by Heidi Bond:Michigan law student Heidi Bond blogs, "our property professor told us to come up with some alternatives to a First-In-Time scheme for distribution of new resources," and one of the alternatives a classmate came up with was "Bribery--the person willing to pay the largest bribe to the government </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566633825854549'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566633825854549'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566633825854549' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-107566543688503816</id><published>2004-02-01T14:57:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T14:59:33.560-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Antitrust Law Blog: Someone recently came to this site via a Google search for "Antitrust Law Blog." I hope this search was a preemption check of sorts, and that the person who entered the terms has plans to start such a blog. What a great idea.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566543688503816'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/107566543688503816'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_archive.html#107566543688503816' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106719774800646034</id><published>2003-10-26T14:49:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2004-02-01T15:00:11.060-05:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Douglas Baird (Chicago) and Robert Rasmussen (Vanderbilt) have posted Chapter 11 at Twilight. Abstract: In The End of Bankruptcy we detailed the forces that have rendered obsolete traditional conceptions of corporate reorganization. In a response to our article, Lynn LoPucki asserts that our paper lacked empirical foundation. In this response, we draw on LoPucki's data set of </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106719774800646034'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106719774800646034'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106719774800646034' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106686530065430929</id><published>2003-10-22T19:28:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-22T19:28:20.566-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Ron Harris (Berkeley) has posted The Uses of History in Law and Economics. Abstract: During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the humanities and social sciences have turned toward history, something that culminated in the 1990s, and this phenomenon was evident in law as well. However, until recently, law and economics, the most influential post-World War II </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106686530065430929'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106686530065430929'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106686530065430929' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106677776913225156</id><published>2003-10-21T19:09:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-22T09:39:48.373-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Ilya Somin (GMU) has posted Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the 'Central Obsession' of Constitutional Theory. Abstract:This Article is the first ever to assess the significance of widespread political ignorance in the American electorate for the countermajoritarian difficulty. It argues that voter ignorance greatly reduces the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106677776913225156'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106677776913225156'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106677776913225156' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106674358144775643</id><published>2003-10-21T09:39:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-21T09:39:41.130-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Workshop: Today as part of the University of Chicago's Olin Program in Law and Economics, Jennifer Arlen (NYU) workshops Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice (co-authored with Eric Talley). </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106674358144775643'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106674358144775643'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106674358144775643' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106670740609754439</id><published>2003-10-20T23:36:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-20T23:36:45.826-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Joseph Farrell (Berkeley, Economics) and Phil Weiser (Colorado, Law) have posted Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age (forthcoming in the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology). Abstract: Antitrust law and telecommunications regulation have long adopted different stances on whether to </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106670740609754439'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106670740609754439'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106670740609754439' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106669025616601276</id><published>2003-10-20T18:50:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-20T20:02:53.133-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Marginal Revolution's Guest: In case one interested in law and economics needed another reason to follow Marginal Revolution, here it is--Lloyd Cohen is currently guest blogging there. What a treat! Here's a bit from his first post, "A Taxonomy of Methods for Discriminating":Not all procedures for engaging in racial discrimination are equal. They differ in their legal standing, their social </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106669025616601276'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106669025616601276'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106669025616601276' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106668914860750911</id><published>2003-10-20T18:32:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-20T18:32:28.483-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Reader Mail: Olof Hellman writes in with some interesting remarks in regards to my previous posts on the endowment effect and why I was attending "the big game":Your posts on the endowment effect have been thought provoking.  My intuition is that upon receiving your ticket, you valued it according to a gift economy rather than (or in addition to) an exchange economy -- and that treating a </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106668914860750911'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106668914860750911'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106668914860750911' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106651917279622646</id><published>2003-10-18T19:19:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-18T19:19:32.700-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Richard Thaler: Check out Will Baude's selection for "Quote of the Day."</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106651917279622646'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106651917279622646'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106651917279622646' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106651886968556074</id><published>2003-10-18T19:14:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-18T19:15:18.143-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Behavioral Economics: Marginal Revolution points to this post from 2Blowhards on behavioral economics. The post's author offers his thoughts on the subject:Is behavioral econ a comprehensive challenge to classical theory, a helpful new addition to it, or a meaningless fad? I'd be the last person to know, of course, but I'm certainly finding it a provocative development to read about. Why? </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106651886968556074'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106651886968556074'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106651886968556074' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106639784352752119</id><published>2003-10-17T09:37:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-17T09:37:56.503-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Smoking Bans: Proffesor Bainbridge has a nice post on the influx of state mandated smoking bans in private establishments. Clearly, smokers do not internalize all of the costs associated with their actions. But does this alone warrant government intervention? No, says Professor Bainbridge:The mere existence of an externality does not justify legislation.... In a free society, with limited </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106639784352752119'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106639784352752119'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106639784352752119' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106632450858797053</id><published>2003-10-16T13:15:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-16T13:19:44.100-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Workshops: Today, as part of Stanford's Law and Economics Seminar Series, Dan Klerman (USC) presents The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth-Century England.Also today, as part of Michigan's Law and Economics Workshop Series, Doug Lichtman (Chicago) presentes Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106632450858797053'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106632450858797053'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106632450858797053' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106622551437061485</id><published>2003-10-15T09:45:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-15T09:45:13.936-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Colloquium Series: Today at Northwestern's Law and Economics Colloquium Series, David Schizer (Columbia) delivers Scaling Up and the Taxation of Risky Investments: Derivatives and the Search for Practical Applications.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106622551437061485'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106622551437061485'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106622551437061485' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106618974577241280</id><published>2003-10-14T23:49:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-14T23:49:05.276-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Nicholas Barberis (Chicago Business), Ming Huang (Stanford Business), and Richard Thaler (Chicago Business) have posted Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles and the Equity Premium. Abstract: We argue that narrow framing, whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, separately from other risks she already faces, may be a more important </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106618974577241280'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106618974577241280'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106618974577241280' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106616588260293518</id><published>2003-10-14T17:11:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-14T17:11:22.670-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>All the best to Professor Cooper and his family.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106616588260293518'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106616588260293518'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106616588260293518' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106615303584804152</id><published>2003-10-14T13:37:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-14T13:37:53.130-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Stephen Ross (Illinois) and Stefan Szymanski (London University School of Management) have posted The Law &amp; Economics of Optimal Sports League Design. Abstract: Rejecting the conventional wisdom that sports leagues must be run by the clubs that participate in the competition, we adopt the approach of Australian courts and view sports leagues as products created by the vertical </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106615303584804152'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106615303584804152'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106615303584804152' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106605171715497745</id><published>2003-10-13T09:20:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-13T09:28:36.950-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Workshop: Today at the Center for Law and Economic Studies at Columbia, Patrick Bolton (Princeton, Finance) workshops Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets (authored with Jose Scheinkman and Wei Xiong). Abstract: We present a multiperiod agency model of stock based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors are overconfident and </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106605171715497745'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106605171715497745'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106605171715497745' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106597162743502500</id><published>2003-10-12T11:13:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-12T11:13:47.483-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Claire Hill (Georgetown) has uploaded Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral Law and Economics. Abstract: In this essay, which was presented as the Galway Lecture at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, I argue that law and economics has largely neglected a critical facet of human cognition: the process by which people make sense of the world. People make sense of the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106597162743502500'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106597162743502500'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106597162743502500' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106581605419319992</id><published>2003-10-10T16:00:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-10T16:02:32.276-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>More on the Endowment Effect: Professor Bainbridge offers another potential reason for my unwillingness to sell:[H]is unwillingness to part with the ticket might be an example of Arrow's observation "that interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility." Kenneth Arrow, Social </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106581605419319992'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106581605419319992'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106581605419319992' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106580424378233967</id><published>2003-10-10T12:44:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-10T12:44:03.380-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Law and Economics Colloquium: It has just been brought to my attention that the Northwestern University School of Law is sponsoring a Law and Economics Colloquium Series. You can access the page here, with links to recent and upcoming papers. The latest installment featured Ian Ayres delivering To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping. A permanent link to the series has been </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106580424378233967'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106580424378233967'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106580424378233967' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106573169566406888</id><published>2003-10-09T16:34:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-09T16:34:55.360-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>The Endowment Effect in Action, Or Why I'm Going to the Big Game Even Though it May Not be Rational: It's Good vs. Evil, #5 vs. #2, Law and Economics Blog vs. Discourse.net (in terms of institutional affiliation), it's the biggest game of the year: Florida State vs. Miami in Tallahassee this Saturday. Thankfully, I will be in attendance to cheer on the Seminoles. What I'm equally thankful for is </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106573169566406888'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106573169566406888'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106573169566406888' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106572175345380614</id><published>2003-10-09T13:49:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-09T16:34:21.486-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Claire Hill (Georgetown) has uploaded Review Essay: Law and Economics in the Personal Sphere. Abstract: My review essay makes the case for law and economics in the personal sphere by reviewing and appraising the following four books: Richard Posner, Sex and Reason; Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms; Robert Frank, Luxury Fever, and Margaret Brinig, From Contract to Covenant. My </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106572175345380614'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106572175345380614'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106572175345380614' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106565615786828838</id><published>2003-10-08T19:35:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-08T19:37:41.870-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: The University of Chicago has uploaded a batch of their working papers in law and economics. I've introduced a few of these papers previously, but without abstracts. Some of the papers mentioned previously are now available on SSRN; there were two uploaded that have not been listed on their program page (and are thus only available on SSRN at this time). Here's the entire </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106565615786828838'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106565615786828838'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106565615786828838' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106548603086820599</id><published>2003-10-06T20:20:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-08T19:32:47.640-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Conference Papers Online: The Canadian Law and Economics Association recently held their annual meeting. Most of the papers from that meeting can now be downloaded here. If you only have time for one, try Oren-Bar Gill and Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106548603086820599'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106548603086820599'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106548603086820599' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106548492306413075</id><published>2003-10-06T20:02:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-06T20:02:03.250-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: David P. Redlawsk (Iowa--Political Science) has uploaded Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making. The abstract: Researchers attempting to understand how citizens process political information have advanced motivated reasoning to explain the joint role of affect and cognition. The prominence of affect suggests </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106548492306413075'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106548492306413075'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106548492306413075' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106546107077252399</id><published>2003-10-06T13:22:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-06T14:17:02.716-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Professor Volokh uses cognitive theory to help explain why many of the most popular bloggers are academics: The observation bias explanation: Even if the blogging impulse is as common (or rare) among academics as among others, academics are more likely to become relatively prominent. First, we have a credential that makes people notice us more (whether rightly or wrongly). Second, we do </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106546107077252399'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106546107077252399'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106546107077252399' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106528161677425604</id><published>2003-10-04T11:33:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-04T11:39:43.230-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>On Game Theory's Relevance to Law and Economics: I've been posting the abstracts of new papers that explore various issues through the use of game theoretic models. Students just learning about law and economics (and game theory) are likely to question my apparent assumption that work using game theory is important to law and economics no matter the topic of the particular paper. To get at why </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106528161677425604'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106528161677425604'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106528161677425604' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106527798706158336</id><published>2003-10-04T10:33:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-04T10:33:06.780-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Iris Bohnet (Harvard--Government) and Robert Cooter (Berkeley--Law) have uploaded Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection. The abstract: Besides deterring people, laws may affect behavior by changing preferences or beliefs. A law may elicit intrinsic motivation by framing an act as wrong. Alternatively, it may coordinate the behavior of different people by changing </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106527798706158336'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106527798706158336'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106527798706158336' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106520604101303948</id><published>2003-10-03T14:34:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-03T15:07:57.073-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Posner and Coase: Immortals in Legal Philosophy?: A couple of weeks ago, Professor Solum asked, "Who from the twentieth century will students of legal theory read one hundred years from now, not just because they are of historical interest, but because they truly made an important contribution?" Included in his list of possibilities were two giants in law and economics: Richard Posner and Ronald </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106520604101303948'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106520604101303948'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106520604101303948' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106520190477987904</id><published>2003-10-03T13:25:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-03T13:25:04.573-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Book Review: Surf on over to ProfessorBainbridge.com for the Professor's review of Oliver Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106520190477987904'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106520190477987904'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106520190477987904' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106513110147758212</id><published>2003-10-02T17:45:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-02T17:45:01.203-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Scholarship: Shi-Ling Hsu (George Washington) has uploaded Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law. Here's the abstract: Like many other areas of law, the development of environmental law has been strongly influenced by notions of fairness. This should not be surprising, since environmental law has been developed by lawyers, who are self-selected to be fairness-oriented and trained </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106513110147758212'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106513110147758212'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106513110147758212' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106503864776389326</id><published>2003-10-01T16:04:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-01T16:06:07.763-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Welcome: There are two blogs that make me positively giddy at the thought of reading them every day: Legal Theory Blog and Marginal Revolution. Thanks to Marginal Revolution, I've become aware of a new blog that has already added itself to this short list: Neuroeconomics. The blog's author is Kevin A. McCabe, a professor of Economics and Law and director Behavioral and Neuroeconomics  </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106503864776389326'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106503864776389326'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106503864776389326' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5860482.post-106502810493350744</id><published>2003-10-01T13:07:00.000-04:00</published><updated>2003-10-01T13:09:35.883-04:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Election Law: Professor Rick Hasen's Election Law blog has moved here.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106502810493350744'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5860482/posts/default/106502810493350744'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://lawandeconomics.blogspot.com/2003_10_01_archive.html#106502810493350744' title=''/><author><name>Greg Goelzhauser</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/05456578323669789568</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry></feed>
